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Audit Preparation

This document outlines the security audit preparation for SIP Protocol.

Cryptographic Primitives

  • Pedersen commitment implementation
  • Stealth address generation and recovery
  • Viewing key derivation and encryption
  • NUMS generator construction

SDK Components

  • packages/sdk/src/crypto.ts - Commitments, hashing
  • packages/sdk/src/stealth.ts - Stealth addresses
  • packages/sdk/src/privacy.ts - Viewing keys, encryption
  • packages/sdk/src/validation.ts - Input validation

Critical Paths

  • Key generation flows
  • Intent creation flow
  • Proof generation (when real proofs implemented)
  • Wallet adapter signing
  • Mock implementations (intended for testing only)
  • External dependencies (@noble libraries - already audited)
  • NEAR Intents infrastructure (separate audit)
  • Demo application UI
MetricCurrentTarget
Test Coverage89.88%>90%
Passing Tests741/741100%
Type SafetyStrictStrict
Lint Errors00
  • Constant-time operations via @noble/curves
  • NUMS generator deterministically derived
  • Secure random number generation (OS CSPRNG)
  • No custom cryptographic primitives
  • Field element validation
  • Scalar range validation
  • Private keys never logged
  • Keys validated on import
  • Separate spending and viewing keys
  • Key derivation uses HKDF
  • Secure memory clearing via secureWipe(), withSecureBuffer()
  • Chain ID validation
  • Privacy level validation
  • Hex string format validation
  • Amount validation (positive, within range)
  • Public key format validation
  • Stealth meta-address parsing
  • Typed error classes
  • Error codes for categorization
  • No sensitive data in error messages
  • Graceful degradation

All noble libraries are Trail of Bits audited:

PackageVersionAudit Status
@noble/curves^1.3.0Audited
@noble/hashes^1.3.3Audited
@noble/ciphers^2.0.1Audited
PackagePurposeRisk
viemEthereum utilsLow (widely used)
vitestTestingDev only
typescriptBuildDev only
  1. Generator H construction verified as secure NUMS
  2. Blinding factor non-zero enforcement
  3. Scalar modular reduction
  4. View tag implementation follows EIP-5564
  1. Memory clearing in JavaScript (inherent limitation)
  2. Mock proof security (documented as non-production)
ModuleCoverageTests
crypto.ts95%50
stealth.ts93%40
privacy.ts91%30
validation.ts97%60
FlowCoverageTests
Intent creation100%25
Stealth workflow100%15
Viewing key flow100%20
ScenarioTests
Cross-chain swap30
Privacy verification25
Compliance flow20
Error scenarios30
Performance23
  1. Pedersen commitment math
  2. ECDH shared secret derivation
  3. Stealth address generation
  4. Scalar/field arithmetic
  1. Key generation entropy
  2. Key derivation correctness
  3. No key leakage paths
  4. Validation completeness
  1. Intent construction
  2. Privacy level enforcement
  3. Proof parameter binding
  4. Error paths
ThreatMitigationAudit Focus
Amount disclosurePedersen hidingVerify math
Address linkabilityStealth addressesVerify unlinkability
Key extractionNo logging, validationCheck all paths
Proof forgeryZK verificationCircuit review
Timing attacksConstant-time libsVerify usage

Available for auditors:

  1. Whitepaper - Protocol specification
  2. SIP Spec - Technical specification
  3. Threat Model - Security model
  4. Architecture - System design

For audit coordination:

DateAuditorScopeStatus
Q1 2025Pending SelectionFull SDK + CircuitsPlanned
  1. Address all critical/high findings
  2. Document medium/low findings with rationale
  3. Update this document with findings
  4. Publish audit report